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 Abstract 
 
The selection of a contractor for task award using the IDIQ contract often 
involves dynamics and relationships that are difficult to understand.  There are 
unanswered questions that relate to how government agents define “best value” to the 
government.  The selection decisions often differ between government agents.  The 
government streamlined the acquisition process by creating the multiple award IDIQ 
contract.  Government agents are relied upon to make sound business judgments in 
determining which contractor represents the best value to the government.  Informal 
influences can impact the determination of the final selection of a contractor.  This thesis 
attempts to create a better conceptual framework for the informal influences that affect 
the dynamic selection process of contractors for task award.  The research consisted of 
interviews with members of government agencies that routinely make IDIQ contract task 
awards. 
Results indicate that informal, or soft, factors play a large role in determining 
which contractor will be awarded a task.  The most influential factors that affect task 
award are identified and discussed in depth.  The research determined that some 
marketing processes can be totally ineffective or even counterproductive at times.  The 
results also show that formal rating systems are often replaced by informal peer networks.  
Existing research on selection processes in the private sector proved comparable to 
processes used at the government agencies participating in this study.  
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INFORMAL INFLUENCES IN THE PROCESS OF IDIQ CONTRACTOR 
SELECTION FOR TASK AWARD 
 
 I.  Introduction 
 
 
Background 
 In 1994, Congress passed the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) to 
simplify and streamline the federal acquisition process.  The regulation established 
preferences for awarding, to the maximum extent possible, multiple delivery or task order 
contracts for the same or similar services or property (U.S. Congress, 1994).  The FASA 
created a multiple award, indefinite delivery – indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract tool, 
enabling government agencies to retain a pool of contractors to perform recurring tasks of 
a certain type, such as architectural-engineering services or environmental remediation.  
Using IDIQ contracts, government agencies can issue multiple task awards under the 
same basic contract to a number of selected contractors.  Two such organizations that 
make use of the IDIQ contract are the U.S. Air Force Center for Environmental 
Excellence (AFCEE) and the Kansas City District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE-KC).  These two organizations served as the research participants in this study. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that an IDIQ contract provides 
for an indefinite quantity of supplies or services to be furnished within a fixed period 
(Arnavas, 2001).  The IDIQ process reduces government time and resources required for 
task award, while at the same time maintaining a level of competition that keeps 
individual contract costs down.  The FAR mandates that the government provide all 
participating contractors with a statement that outlines the “procedures and selection 
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criteria that the government will use to provide awardees a fair opportunity to be 
considered for each order” (FAR 16.504).  Contractors are initially selected to take part in 
an IDIQ contract through a source selection in which they submit qualifications, 
experience and merit for government review.  The government measures qualifications 
by comparing the contractor’s capabilities to the requirements of the IDIQ contract in 
question.  Experience is measured by comparing the contractor’s past work to the type of 
work required by the IDIQ contract.  Merit is based on the contractor’s past performance, 
notably in work performed for the government.  The government uses these submissions, 
and a review of the contractor’s past performance, to assess the contractor’s abilities.  
Those found to be the best alternatives are selected to take part in the IDIQ contract, thus 
creating a pool that can be tasked when requirements arise.  The demonstration of 
competence and capability exhibited in the initial source selection allow the government 
to streamline the acquisition process by limiting awards to prior screened contractors.   
The government prefers IDIQ contracts when a predetermined quantity is difficult 
to predict; however, the IDIQ contract is only used when a recurring need for the service 
is anticipated.  While the FAR mandates that each contractor be given a fair opportunity 
to be awarded each order (except under special circumstances), it also specifically states 
that “formal evaluation plans or scoring of quotes or offers are not required” (FAR 
16.505).  This process allows the federal government to easily award contracts on 
specific tasks without the lengthy process of placing jobs out for bidding.  In addition, 
more trust is built between the government and the contractor during competent 
exchanges.  When a particular task arises, one of the contractors in the IDIQ contract is 
chosen for task award by a team of selectors consisting of various members of the 
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organization.  This selection team might consist of a contracting officer, a project 
manager, a program manager, and/or the customer. 
 A DoD Office of the Inspector General audit found that 36 of 58 multiple award 
task order contracts were not awarded to the lowest priced contractor (IG/DoD-99-116).  
This suggests that decision drivers other than cost determined contractor selection.  
Additionally, 66 of 124 task orders were found to have been awarded on a sole source 
basis, further indicating a predetermined informal preference by selectors or selecting 
organizations. 
IDIQ contracts take advantage of the government selectors’ individual expertise 
and judgment.  By not strictly regulating attributes and scales that contractors will be 
graded against, the government relies on its contracting officers to make sound business 
judgments that represent the best value to the government.  However, by relying on 
individual expertise and judgment, the government introduces the chance that task awards 
may be made via different methods and against non-uniform scales. 
 
Problem 
 The specific problem initiating this research is lack of knowledge of informal 
decision-making processes that selectors use in selecting contractors that represent a 
“best value” to the government for task award in the IDIQ process.  Identification of the 
informal processes used in selection will provide more understanding and knowledge of 
the process.  A deeper understanding of the dynamics that occur in contractor selection 
will allow contractors to improve their marketing processes and will reduce the risk to the 
government in the selection process.  In addition, if the process of selecting an IDIQ 
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contractor for task award can be compared to normal organizational buying center 
decision processes, then conclusions can be drawn using the existing literature on 
organizational buying.  Questions include:   
• What factors influence decision makers and are these factors comparable 
to those uncovered in research done on private sector selection processes 
in industrial buying? 
• To what extent do these factors influence selection? 
• What are the informal scales that selectors use to grade IDIQ contractors?   
• Do the different organizational cultures being studied (USAF vs. COE) 
differ significantly and if so, how is this shown in the selection process 
and results? 
• How can the government buying agency – private contractor relationship 
be more efficient for both sides?   
This thesis attempted to answer questions that arose from the informal processes 
associated with contractor selection.  A better understanding of these informal processes 
should allow the government and contractors to do business more efficiently. The 
interviews conducted led the research to seek out a more thorough understanding of the 
informal networks that exist within the government agencies included in the research and 
the marketing process that contractors use in attempts to garner task awards through the 
IDIQ process.  These additional questions were: 
• How much does the informal network affect the organization’s selection 
of a contractor for task award? 
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• How does the organization view the marketing process that contractors use 
and how does it influence the decision making process? 
In the end, these questions were a main focus of the research.  Overall, this 
research focused on the “soft” aspects that influence decision makers.  These soft aspects 
include chemistry between the contractor and the decision makers, perceptions about a 
contractor’s commitment to the buying organization, and/or trust of a contractor.  “Hard” 
aspects of the evaluation of a contractor include capability, past performance ratings, 
and/or current workload.  These aspects can, however, at times be viewed as soft aspects 
because they still are based on the subjective view of the decision maker. 
 In the IDIQ contract, contractors that are vying for task award have already been 
through an exhaustive selection process.  All of the contractors in the IDIQ pool are 
usually qualified to perform the duties established in the IDIQ contract.  For this reason, 
the consideration of soft factors as determining criteria in the selection process is of 
greater importance. 
 
Methodology 
 The objective of this thesis was to research and document the informal influences 
of the IDIQ contractor selection process.  A qualitative methodology was used to 
accomplish this objective.  The steps taken are outlined below: 
• Make an initial data gathering trip to an IDIQ contract awarding agency and use 
this data to guide the formation of a general interview guide. 
• Refine the focus of the research based on the initial data gathering trip. 
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• Gather and analyze data from selected government organizations using the 
general interview guide. 
• Formulate framework for identifying reoccurring themes and concepts that have 
surfaced from data analysis. 
• Compare organizations to one another for possible similarities and differences. 
• Conclude with recommendations for more efficient working relationship between 
government and contractors. 
A detailed synopsis of the research methodology is included in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
  
Scope 
This research sought a better understanding of mental models and informal 
processes used in selecting contractors for IDIQ contracts.  The research took a 
qualitative approach to gathering and analyzing data that could then be synthesized into a 
report.  This allowed the researcher to obtain rich data that would capture the subtleties of 
the selection process.  The qualitative methodology permitted the researcher, through 
open conversation and interviews, to immerse themselves in the field and better 
understand the participant’s perspective.   
Guidelines and processes in selection are mandated by federal regulation, as 
stated in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), but this research focused on the 
undefined, informal processes that impact selections.  This includes the incorporation of 
values, judgments, and other intangibles (unwritten) that drive, guide, or influence 
government employees in their individual and collective preferences to work with one 
contractor over another.  Selectors are required to make selections based on the “best 
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value” to the government.  Government agents involved in the selection process were 
interviewed to gain insight to the settings and situations in which selections are made.  In 
addition, individual values, military values, organizational values, preferences and biases 
were identified and examined for their influences on the selection processes.  These 
interviews were the basis for an emergence of a grounded theory, based on the data 
gathered. 
Included in the sample were representatives of the U.S. Air Force Center for 
Environmental Excellence and the Kansas City District of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers.  Review of processes in these two organizations allowed for a comparison of 
contractor selection and IDIQ contract implementation across two different 
organizational cultures, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army. At this organizational 
level, information from more experienced selection members will be collected, rather 
than the generally less experienced selectors at base level installations.  Selection 
decisions at base level are generally smaller in nature and are less frequently done.  
Further focusing the scope of participants, the research examined global and regional 
contracts.   
 
Assumptions/Concerns 
 A critical assumption of this research was that the government selectors who were 
interviewed willingly provided complete and honest information in such a potentially 
sensitive area.  No selector wanted to be viewed as unfair.  There was a concern that this 
may have kept some participants from fully revealing or explaining their selection 
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methods.  The sample members were assured that all information gathered would be 
presented anonymously. 
 A concern of this effort was the limited number of participants.  While the Air 
Force Center for Environmental Excellence had over ten research participants, the Corps 
of Engineers – Kansas City District had only six research participants.  The views were, 
however, mostly consistent.  At no time did the researcher feel that entirely different 
opinions were given as responses to the research questions.  This was positive in regards 
to the validity of the research, since there was such a small sample size.  Also, the fact 
that AFCEE deals with global contracts and USACE-KC executes contracts in a strict 
geographical area may deem the two agencies incomparable.  Based on the responses 
obtained by the research participants, however, both agencies experience many of the 
same influences in the selection processes.     
 
Summary 
 This chapter provided an introduction to the IDIQ contract process and the issues 
surrounding this process.  A brief history of the formation of the IDIQ contract was 
presented, as well as problems that have arisen with the IDIQ contract since its inception. 
The specific interest of the research to the IDIQ contract task award process followed, 
with overviews of the research methodology, scope, and assumptions/concerns. 
 Chapter 2 provides an in-depth view of the regulations that govern the execution 
of the IDIQ contract, as well as an overview of research that has been conducted in the 
private sector for similar buying situations.  Chapter 3 reviews the methodology used for 
the research, to include the research design, the sample population, and the data 
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collection method.  Chapter 4 provides a detailed review of the results of the data 
collections, along with detailed analysis of each topic of interest to the research.  Finally, 
Chapter 5 provides conclusions that can be drawn from the analyzed data and 
recommends areas that may be of interest for future research. 
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 II. Literature Review 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 This literature review includes discussions of the history and requirements of the 
indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract and the current research and 
literature on private sector selection processes.  The government has ordered audits 
performed at its agencies with the goal of gaining a stronger perspective on the selection 
procedures that those agencies use.  Most audits, however, have searched for the 
existence of unfair practices rather than attempting to identify the actual reality of 
selection processes and influences.  An overview of the audits performed is included in 
this literature review.  Private sector research provides useful insight into the informal 
influences and cues of the service contractor selection process.  An overview of the 
existing private sector research is provided. 
 
Federal Acquisition Regulation and IDIQ Contracts 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) section 16.501-1 defines a “delivery 
order contract” as “a contract for supplies that does not procure or specify a firm quantity 
of supplies  (other than a minimum or maximum quantity) and that provides for the 
issuance of orders for the delivery of supplies during the period of the contract” (Federal 
Acquisition Council, 2000).  A “task order contract” is defined in the same manner but 
with services in place of supplies.  The FAR states that the indefinite delivery contract 
may be used when the exact quantities or times of future deliveries of supplies or services 
are not known at the time of contract award. 
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The FAR lists advantages of the IDIQ contract tool as (Federal Acquistion Council, 
2000): 
1) Permits Government stock to be maintained at minimum levels 
2) Permits direct shipment to users 
3) Permits flexibility in both quantities and delivery scheduling 
4) Permits ordering of supplies and services after requirements materialize 
5) Limits the Government’s obligation to the minimum quantity stated in the 
contract 
6) Permits faster deliveries when production lead time is involved, because 
contractors are usually willing to maintain limited stocks when the Government 
will obtain all of its actual purchase requirements from the contractor 
7) Provides for any appropriate cost or pricing arrangement 
FAR section 16.504 regulates the IDIQ contract.  An established preference for 
multiple awards is mandated.  The contracting officer must give preference to making 
multiple awards of IDIQ contracts under a single solicitation for similar supplies or 
services to two or more sources (Federal Acquisition Council, 2000).  In deciding 
whether a multiple award case is appropriate, a contracting officer must make a number 
of determinations.  First, an attempt should be made to avoid situations where awardees 
specialize exclusively in only one or a few areas specified in the statement of work 
governing the contract.  This would lead to sole source awarding, which limits 
competition and thus should be avoided.  However, each awardee does not have to be 
capable of performing every requirement in the statement of work as well as all other 
awardees.   
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 A contracting officer must provide fair opportunity for every contractor in the 
IDIQ pool to be considered for all orders exceeding $2,500.  There are special 
circumstances when fair opportunity may be sacrificed, but those cases are beyond the 
scope of this research.  The FAR specifically states that contracting officers may use 
broad discretion in developing order placement procedures.  The following is a list of 
items mentioned in the FAR that concern awarding orders using the IDIQ contract: 
1)  May use streamlined procedures, including oral presentations 
2)  Need not contact each of the awardees under the contract if sufficient 
evidence is on hand to ensure that each awardee is provided for a fair 
opportunity to be considered for award 
3)  May not used methods, such as designation of preferred awardee, that would 
not result in every awardee receiving a fair opportunity to be awarded the 
task 
4)  Tailor the procedures to each acquisition 
5)  Include the procedures in the solicitation and contract 
6)  Consider price as a factor for selection in each award 
7)  Consider past performance on previous awards 
8)  Consider impact of award on other tasks awarded to the contractor 
9)  Keep minimum order requirements in mind 
10)  Formal evaluation plans or scoring of quotes or offers are not required 
 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 has gone through 
multiple revisions since its implementation.  Most of these revisions have stemmed from 
findings that contracting officers were not executing IDIQ contract procedures in 
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accordance with statutory requirements.  Various audits were performed as a result of 
concern expressed over fairness and misuse of the contracts.  The first audit was executed 
by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1998.  Two other audits were performed by 
the Office of the Inspector General Department of Defense (IG/DoD) in 1999 and 2001.  
These audits identified two major concerns in task award procedures.  First, agencies 
were naming preferred contractors.  This practice of naming preferred contractors 
obviously limited the fairness received by all contractors when being considered for each 
task award.  Second, contracting officers were making awards on a sole source basis.  
This eliminated the competition aspect of the award, and thus was seen as a potential 
waste of tax dollars. 
The first audit, titled Acquisition Reform: Multiple-award Contracting at Six 
Federal Installations, was performed out of concern that federal agencies were avoiding 
competitive requirements when ordering under task- or delivery-order contracts (General 
Accounting Office, 1998).  The six organizations reviewed were the Defense Information 
Systems Agency, the Department of Transportation, the General Services Administration, 
the National Institutes of Health, The United States Air Force, and the Standard Systems 
Group.  The results of the studied varied with the organization.  One organization 
awarded 64% of task orders on a sole source basis.  Another organization made a practice 
of naming preferred contractors in announcements of opportunities, which resulted in 
only one proposal being received in most cases.  After the results of this audit were 
disclosed to Congress, federal agencies were directed to eliminate the practice of naming 
preferred contractors when announcing opportunities.  They were also directed to revise 
procurement regulations to prohibit the practice.  In 2000, the Federal Acquisition 
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Regulation Council revised existing regulations to limit the practice of sole source 
awarding and prohibited the naming of preferred contractors by agencies when requesting 
submissions for task award selections (Federal Acquistion Circular, 2000). 
 
Buying Center Decision Making Processes 
To date, the only published research examining government IDIQ contractor 
selection are Congressional audits and internal examinations performed by the agencies 
themselves.  While formal methods of analyzing candidate contractors for task award 
have been examined and regulated, the informal methods have yet to be identified.  
Because most actual selections of contractors for task award are not made until multiple 
stages of selection are completed, soft factors often become the deciding factors for final 
selection.   These soft factors have been researched in the private sector, although the 
research is not exhaustive.  The current research examined the similarities revealed 
between selection processes at government installations and private sector organizations 
in hopes of applying knowledge already obtained in the private sector to the government. 
For this research, government agencies that make task awards may be referred to 
as governmental buying centers.  According to an article in the Journal of Business and 
Industrial Marketing, “the buying center concept suggests that organizational purchase 
decisions often involve more than one person, particularly in modified rebuy and new 
task purchases where some or all aspects of the purchasing situation are new to the 
organization (McNally, 2002).  In this instance, the area of interest to buying centers is 
determining which contractors will best meet the organizational requirements of the task 
to be awarded.  These decisions are often made using incomplete information on the 
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contractors.  This incomplete information causes uncertainty, which in turn leads the 
buying center to search for generalizations that can be used to describe characteristics of 
successful contractors.  These characteristics are identified using tools such as past 
performance ratings, peer evaluation, project manager experience, or base preference. 
Even though most organizational purchase decisions are made more rationally 
than those by single consumers, dealing with incomplete information can often lead to 
differences of opinion between organizational decision makers.  It is what causes these 
differences of opinion and the resolution of these differences that this research is 
interested in.  Both informational and normative social influences affect decision-making 
within the buying center.  Informational social influence involves accepting information 
gathered from another person as evidence of reality, whereas normative social influence 
involves conforming with the expectations of others (McNally, 2002).  McNally states 
that social influence and organizational buyer behavior has received only a small amount 
of research attention.  A possible reason given is the difficulty researchers find in 
collecting real-world data from organizational buying groups. 
In 1982, Laughlin and Earley separated group decision tasks into two types: 
intellective and judgmental.  Intellective tasks are decisions that have a correct and 
definite answer, like a mathematical problem.  Judgmental tasks do not have one correct 
answer or decision.  Judgmental tasks usually involve evaluative, behavioral, or aesthetic 
judgments (McNally, 2002).  Evaluation of contractors for task award is largely 
judgmental.  Research done by Kaplan and Miller in 1987 showed that informational 
influence is more prevalent in intellective tasks while normative influence is used more 
15 
frequently in judgmental tasks (Day, 1992)  Government buying center decision makers 
appear to be impacted by both normative and informational influences. 
In the context of this research, government buying centers were seen as mixed-
motive groups.  In social psychology, decision-making groups are referred to as 
cooperative groups or mixed-motive groups.  Cooperative groups are made up of 
members at equal status who all had the same stake in the outcome of the decision.  
Mixed-motive groups consist of members who do not share equally in the stakes of the 
decision and who are not of equal status (Komorita and Parks, 1995).  This distinction is 
made because factors such as past relationships and political influences can lead to 
competition among decision making members. 
According to an article in the Journal of Business Research, the decision-making 
uncertainty (DMU) of organizational buyers has a negative effect on purchase behaviors 
(Gao et al, 2003).  DMU refers to the uncertainty that organizational buyers have in terms 
of the outcomes of a purchase decision.  This area of research is of interest to this thesis 
because it deals with the relationship between organizational buyers and the providing 
contractors.  Gao et al. (2003) state that “the emerging literature on interfirm trust in both 
marketing and management suggests that an important relational construct, buyers’ trust, 
deters the threat of opportunism and lowers buyers’ DMU”. 
Being able to trust a contractor is an important aspect of the task award process.  
Trust can be defined as perceived reliability and integrity of a contractor and can be 
viewed in terms of confidence, consistency, and benevolence (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  
If a government decision maker perceives a contractor to be trustworthy in these terms, 
they will be less worried about being taken advantage of by that contractor.  In other 
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words, the higher the government agent’s trust in a contractor is, the lower that 
government agent’s DMU will be.  Research conducted by Gao et al. (2003) supports this 
statement. 
Day and Barksdale (1992) conducted a study on the process that organizations use 
to select professional services, such as architecture and engineering.  They identified four 
dimensions that were critical to the final selection: 
1) perceived experience, expertise, and competence of the provider 
2) the provider’s understanding of the client’s needs and interests 
3) the provider’s relationship and communication skills 
4) the likelihood of the provider conforming to contractual and administrative 
requirements 
These four dimensions, notably 2 and 3, require the decision maker’s subjective 
perception of the contractor.  This is often greatly influenced by soft factors that emerge 
in the interaction between contractor and buying agency. 
 Day and Barksdale (1994) also discuss a critical difference between the initial 
selection of possible providers and the further evaluation of the “short list” for actual task 
award.  This corresponds to the initial source selection that contractors must pass before 
they can be included in an IDIQ contract pool and the actual process of task award.  
Aspects influence these different stages in varying degrees. 
 Ralph G. Kaufmann (1996) review existing literature pertaining to buying center 
decision making and identifies four categories of sources of infuences that impact buying 
decisions: individual characteristics, group factors, organizational factors, and 
environmental factors.    This categorization provides a framework for breaking down the 
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whole buying decision, enabling a more thorough understanding of the total process that 
buying centers use when making selections. 
 Research in the private sector suggests that marketers may be able to alter their 
personal interactions with purchasing managers in ways that would increase the 
purchasing managers’ efficiency, power, and certainty (Tellefson, 2002).  Examples of 
these possible alterations are providing faster responses to information requests or 
adjusting the way information is distributed to the buying firm, which would involve little 
or no cost (Tellefson, 2002).  Recent research also suggests that today’s buying centers 
are different from traditional buyers that needed to be sold and could be manipulated 
(Reid et al, 2002).  Buyers now tell salespeople what they want, and expect salespeople to 
listen, cooperate, and provide them with the information they need. 
 
Naturalistic Decision Making 
 In the initial stages of the research, an attempt was made to match the selection 
process to a naturalistic decision making model.  Initial interviews, however, led to the 
conclusion that an attempt to match this selection process to a naturalistic decision-
making process would benefit neither the government nor the contractors in this business 
relationship.  The final product would not be applicable to field conditions.  However, a 
review of the naturalistic decision making models in existing literature is discussed.  The 
closest naturalistic decision-making sub-model that was encountered was Henry 
Montgomery's Search for Dominance Structure (Klein & others, 1993).  The aspect of 
this sub-model did seem a close fit at times.  In the end, a grounded theory approach was 
adopted in order to make the research more thorough, applicable, and accurate.  
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Grounded theory is a discovery methodology where theory emerges from data that is 
gathered directly from the field.  In the absence of previous theory in this area, grounded 
theory became the logical approach for the purpose of gathering rich data. 
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 III. Research Methodology 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter discusses the method of which data was gathered and analyzed with 
the purpose of answering the research questions posed in Chapter 1.  A qualitative 
approach was conducted in gathering data for this research.  The rationale behind the 
chosen methodology, as well as the rationale for sample selection, is reviewed.  The 
research respondents were not questioned on their interpretation of the regulations laid 
forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), but rather on their perceptions of the 
influences and factors that affect contractor selection using the Indefinite Delivery – 
Indefinite Quality (IDIQ) process. 
 
Research Design 
  This research was a qualitative effort, depending on lengthy, open-ended 
interviews with the selectors in the IDIQ task award processes.  The qualitative approach 
allows for the gathering of a wealth of information that allows issues to be studied in 
depth and detail (Patton, 2002).  The data collection process was nonmanipulative and 
noncontrolling with a lack of predetermined constraints on findings, in accordance with 
guidance found in Patton’s literature on qualitative study (Patton, 2002).  Throughout the 
process, the research remained open to adaptation as understanding and insight of the 
selection process grew. 
 A series of interview techniques were employed to gather rich data, beginning 
with informal conversational interviews and following with interviews led by a general 
interview guide.  Initially, a trip was made to the Air Force Center for Environmental 
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Excellence (AFCEE) to administer a series of informal conversational interviews.  A 
direct contact approach was taken, giving the results the chance to come directly from the 
empirical world (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).   The research relied on these informal 
conversational interviews to establish the direction that the research should take.  This 
method allowed the flexibility to structure the study in the most appropriate manner.  
There were no predetermined questions, but only a broad area that encompassed the 
selection process.  Research participants were given the opportunity to discuss the aspects 
of the selection process that they felt had the biggest impact and were the least 
understood. 
 Following the initial round of data gathering, a general interview guide method 
was taken.  This method involved outlining a set of topics that were to be covered with 
each respondent before the interviewing process began (Patton, 2002).  For this purpose, 
an interview guide was prepared.  The interview guide ensured that each person 
interviewed receives the same line of inquiry.  Setting forth a guide to the interview in the 
later stages of data gathering was necessary due to time limits on both the interviewer’s 
and interviewees’ parts.  This interview guide is included in Appendix A. 
The sample members were questioned on elements of the decision-making 
processes used and factors and settings that influence the outcome of the selection 
process.  Both face-to-face and phone interviews were conducted.  These interviews were 
bolstered by follow up e-mails that included reiterations of questions that were important 
to the research.  Past task awards were discussed and government agents that took part in 
the award process were interviewed in depth to understand the drivers of the selection.  
Interviews were loosely structured to allow the uncovering of individual experiences and 
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influences.  Data was grouped into categories and analyzed for consistent or diverging 
perspectives.  The two cultures in the sample (Air Force and Army) were compared for 
similarities and differences. 
The qualitative approach was appropriate because of the lack of previous research 
into the IDIQ contractor selection process at government installations.  The findings were 
relative to government agencies, as two different organizations, each with their own 
culture studied in the research.  The qualitative methodology enabled the research to 
capture the complexities that arise as government agents make selections for task award.  
This approach has shown that these complexities can be captured, allowing researchers to 
fully understand subtleties that play a part in a given situation (Locke:95, 2001). 
Existing research on selection processes at civilian “buying centers” was reviewed 
for possible matches to the results of the interviews conducted for this research.  There 
was not an overabundance of research that dealt with the selection methods used in 
purchasing services, such as architectural-engineering or environmental remediation, but 
the research that has been conducted can be of much use to the government and those 
contractors that wish to win government task awards. 
A qualitative research approach was taken to allow the gathering of rich data.  
This allowed the capture of small nuances and influences of the selection processes.  The 
qualitative approach was also taken in most private sectors research that examined the 
selection process of the purchase of services by buying centers.  The research was 
accomplished through grounded theory and now research with a goal of defining informal 
processes of selecting contractors for task award through the IDIQ contract tool.  
Grounded theory and research is a discovery methodology where theory emerges from 
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data that is gathered directly from the field.  This methodology seemed the best fit for the 
research because there is an absence of information and previous theory in the area of 
informal decision processes in IDIQ contractor selection.  Also, grounded theory research 
is a highly evolving research process that tends to be based on sociological processes and 
norms.  The constantly emerging data generates new theories that attempt to explain 
human nature and tendencies.  Attitudes, biases, perceptions and other such drivers 
influence human action.  Grounded theory is the most applicable research method to 
encompass and capture these elements.  The grounded theory approach allows the 
researcher, through open conversation and interviews, to immerse themselves in the field 
and see the process through the eyes of the research participant.  Only by doing this can 
the researcher conceptualize and make use out of the data gathered. 
None of the decision event theories seemed to adequately frame this problem.  
Existing theories will, however, be reviewed as more data is collected from the field for 
possible reflection. 
 
Population 
The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence provides Air Force leaders 
with the comprehensive expertise and professional services necessary to protect, restore, 
preserve, develop and sustain the nations environmental and installation resources 
(AFCEE Website).  It is the field operating agency of the Air Force Civil Engineer.  The 
AFCEE mission is to provide a complete range of technical and professional services and 
environmental and installation planning engineering, and military housing construction 
and privatization.  Employing 315 authorized civilians and 46 military members, and 
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partnering with many of the nation's most respected and capable contractors, the center's 
multibillion-dollar contracting capacity covers the entire spectrum of environmental and 
construction management services. 
AFCEE has a total of nine IDIQ contracts currently in operation.  Each is listed in 
Appendix C with a general description that includes the program ceiling and number of 
contractors.  This information was taken directly from the AFCEE website at 
www.afcee.brooks.af.mil. 
The U. S. Army Engineer District, Kansas City (USACE-KC), plans, manages 
and executes civil works, military, environmental, and emergency response programs 
within assigned areas of responsibility to support the nation's military and engineering 
needs (website).  According to USACE’KC’s vision statement, they are the world’s 
premier engineering organization.  The organization is trained and ready to provide 
support anytime and anyplace.  The Kansas City District is one of 40 districts in 11 
divisions.  Its missions include Civil Works, Military Construction, the cleanup of 
Hazardous, Toxic and Radiation waste. Its Civil Works boundaries take in parts of 
Missouri, Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska, and Colorado. Its Military Construction boundaries 
encompass the states of Missouri and Kansas. It is responsible for the U.S. Army Reserve 
Design Program in 10 states stretching northward from Missouri. It is the primary design 
district in 7 states and the secondary design district in 8 states for the Hazardous, Toxic, 
and Radiological Waste cleanup program, and it is responsible for Naturally Occurring 
Radioactive Materials Disposal (non-fissionable materials) for the entire United States.  
This information was taken directly from USACE-KC’s website at 
www.nwk.usace.army.mil. 
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Data Collection 
The method of data collection for this research varied slightly between 
organizations.  Two separate visits were made to the Air Force Center of Environmental 
Excellence (AFCEE).  Face-to-face interviews were conducted during these visits.  The 
Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District, interviews were conducted over the phone. 
As stated earlier, informal conversational interviews with members of the AFCEE 
organization provided the direction for the focus of the research.  Data gathered in this 
initial stage was used to create a general interview guide that was then applied to 
interviews at both AFCEE and USACE-KC. 
 The interviews at AFCEE were executed by sitting with the research participant in 
a secluded area where they felt comfortable discussing sensitive information.  The 
interviews were started by the researcher asking the participants to give an explanation of 
the task award process from top to bottom.  The direction of the interview was then 
determined by the research participant’s reply.  The researcher then asked questions, 
based on the participant's verbal and nonverbal reaction.  Those areas in which the 
participants felt strongly were explored further.  Throughout the interview, participants 
were also asked questions that the researcher felt were important to the research.  These 
questions included organizational influence, personal preference, and the participant’s 
view of influences on the selection process.  These interviews lasted between 15 and 45 
minutes.  The amount and intensity of feedback varied among participants. 
 The USACE-KC phone interviews were set up by a point of contact at the 
District.  The number of participants at USACE-KC was smaller due to the time 
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constraints and a smaller number of personnel.  The interviews were started by asking the 
participants to explain the selection process for task award.  Any aspect that might 
contribute to the research was investigated.  The phone interviews were more direct than 
the initial interviews at AFCEE since the earlier experience helped form some concepts 
of the process.  These interviews lasted between 15 and 40 minutes.  Follow-up e-mails 
were sent to allow further expressions by the participants. 
 Both interview methods provided valuable information.  The initial face-to-face 
interviews provided the depth and understanding between those taking part in task 
selection and the researcher.  With this ground level view, the researcher was able to 
conduct the phone interviews in a manner that gathered data nearly as efficiently as it was 
gathered in the initial interviews. 
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Summary 
  This chapter discussed the methods and protocol of the data gathering process of 
the research.  A combination of informal conversational interview and general interview 
guide approaches were taken to ensure the collection of rich and encompassing data.  
This rich data allowed a thorough analysis of influencing trends that occur in contractor 
selection 
 The foundation of this approach was set forth in Patton’s Qualitative and Data 
Collection (Patton, 2002).  Data collection methods allowed the research questions 
outlined in Chapter I to be thoroughly examined.   
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 IV. Results 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the purpose of this research was to gain a better 
understanding of the selection processes for awarding tasks to an Indefinite Delivery – 
Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contractor, notably the influences that affect those selection 
processes.  The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the U.S. Government’s authority 
on contracting with the private sector, gives selection team members freedom to use 
personal judgment to determine the contractor that represents the best value to the 
government.   The research was accomplished through a literature review of the available 
material on service purchasing in the private sector and lengthy, open-ended interviews 
with selection team members at the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence 
(AFCEE) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers – Kansas City District (USACE-KC). 
 
Factors Influencing IDIQ Contractor Selection for Task Award 
Factors that influence selection outcome are divided into two groups, hard factors 
and soft factors.  Hard factors consist of aspects such as the contractors’ current 
workload, proximity to task site, financial capability, or workforce.  Hard factors are 
most often identifiable by their objective properties.  Soft factors are subjective in nature.  
Soft factors become a large part of the selection process when the list of possible choices 
has been significantly narrowed through prior selective measures.  Soft factors include 
personal chemistry between government personnel and contractor points of contact, trust 
placed in a contractor by a selection team member, or personal judgments made about a 
contractor by a selection team member. 
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Many experiences and personal aspects affect the subjective nature of the soft 
aspects that influence selection.  Each selector is unique, so trying to identify every 
experience and personal viewpoint that affects selection would go beyond the scope of 
this research, and would not be generalizable.  For this reason, recurring themes and 
influences were sought during the research. 
 Research participants stated that hard factors were the main discriminators in the 
source selection process where contractors are initially selected to take part in the IDIQ 
contract for a specified period of time.  Rarely are any of the firms that make it into the 
IDIQ selection process unqualified for tasks that were later awarded.  Since only the most 
capable contractors make it through the source selection, it becomes more difficult to 
objectively discriminate them from one another in later selection processes for actual task 
award.  Subjective methods become a large part of the selection process for task award 
once contractors have been through the source selection process. 
 Research participants listed many soft factors as influencing aspects of contractor 
selection.  These included past experience with a contractor, trust issues, compatibility 
between government project manager and contractor project manager, comfort zones, 
customer preference and personal evaluations of the contractor properties.  These soft 
factors were mainly listed as influencing factors that gained importance as the selection 
process neared task award. 
 Certain actions taken by a contractor highly influenced the subjective judgments 
made by selectors.  Exhibiting a willingness to work as a team with the government was 
discussed as lowering the risk a selector felt when recommending a contractor for task 
award.  Also, the manner in which a contractor handled contract modifications in past 
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performances was noted by most research participants.  If a contractor used a contract 
modification to inflate costs as a tool to increase profits, they often hurt their chances of 
being considered for task award for future tasks.  This harm can greatly outweigh the 
current benefits a contractor received. 
 Customer preference plays a large role in the selection process for both AFCEE 
and USACE-KC.  Many of the Kansas City district contracts go to repeat customers such 
as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Because these customers are often 
familiar with the few contractors in the IDIQ pools, they often take part in the selection 
process.  It is not uncommon to find a customer representative on the selection board.  
Due to this arrangement, customer preference can play a large role in the selection 
process.  AFCEE selection members always ask the customer for any contractor 
preferences they may have for completing a task.  This preference could be used either 
for creating a final list of contractors to select from or for a final task award.  If the 
customer does have preference, it often overrides the preferences of the AFCEE 
selector’s recommendation. 
 
Informal Network Influence on Contractor Selection 
 An informal network is the mouth-to-ear method of passing information, biases 
and informal evaluations from one member of an organization to another. The simplicity 
of this system makes it widely used and a large factor in the selection process.  The 
informal network was identified as the most used method of a selector gaining 
information on a contractor.  Every respondent that participated in the research 
mentioned the informal network as an influence on their selection recommendations.  
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 Both organizations that participated in the research had a robust informal network 
in place.  This informal network allowed selection team members to benefit from the 
combined experience of other organization members.  The informal network was not 
confined to the organization itself, but included input from other districts and from 
customers that had past experiences with the contractors. 
 The formal rating database is a tool the organization uses to allow organization 
members to formally pass on contractor performances of the past.  This database, 
however, is normally only used when a selector is considering using a contractor with 
whom they have not previously worked, and even in this instance, members seem more 
likely to ask peers about past experiences with a certain contractor.  Also, the databases 
only screen out extreme cases of contractor performance.  An extreme high or extreme 
low rating must be documented thoroughly.  A satisfactory rating can be documented 
easily, and thus does not carry much weight.  Organization members voluntarily enter 
this documentation into the database.  Without incentive, one can see why this doesn't 
always happen.  A satisfactory rating does not require near the amount of documentation 
that an extreme rating requires.  It is much easier for members to use the informal 
network instead. 
 Project managers often discuss their experiences with contractors amongst one 
another.  According to research participants, extreme successes and failures are passed on 
immediately to other project managers.  If a contractor is rated high in the database for 
performance but has had problems with government project managers in the past, that 
information was informally passed on to the selection team.  This is an example of the 
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power of the informal network.  Information on contractors is easy to pass on through 
word-of-mouth. 
 Less experienced selectors, or those that had held their positions for shorter 
periods of time, relied more heavily on the informal network.  This may stem from that 
selector not having an extensive amount of experience with the numerous contractors in 
the IDIQ pools.  Also, if a selection team member was not an expert in the field that the 
task encompassed, peers were consulted for information, which in turn influenced the 
selector’s award recommendation. 
 The informal network played a very large role in thinning a large contractor pool 
down to a manageable number of contractors.  A selection team or member used the 
informal network to whittle a list of 30 or more contractors down to 4 or 5 contractors in 
many cases.  The elimination of a contractor from the final list could simply be a bad 
review by a peer of the selector.  A contractor that made a final list may have done so 
simply by having a trusting a positive relationship with another project manager that 
passed on the information through the informal network. 
 
Influences of the Contractor Marketing Process 
 Marketing is the process by which contractors attempt to garner task awards from 
the buying center.  The government buying centers participating in this research are 
AFCEE and USACE.  Based on input from both organizations, the marketing process 
was felt to be excessive and time consuming. The overwhelming majority of respondents 
described marketing as an inefficient process that drains a huge amount of manpower.  
While selection team members agreed that contractors should make themselves known to 
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those who are influencing the final task award decision, they felt that the large majority 
of marketing that takes place does not influence the actual selection process.  In fact, 
most participants agreed that at times, the marketing process may even negatively affect a 
contractor’s chance of being selected for final task award.  Unscheduled marketing visits 
were specifically mentioned as being unwanted and unproductive on both the government 
and contractor sides. 
 Some initial preferences to the marketing approach surfaced during the research 
interviews.  In terms of preparation, selectors prefer a contractor to be knowledgeable on 
the subject being discussed, namely a particular task or base.  Contractors that show 
knowledge of the base at which the task is to take place and on the specifics that task 
have better interactions with selection team members.  Contractors might gain preference 
by being factual rather than performing a “dog and pony show” sales pitch.  Well 
prepared contractor project managers (PMs) were discussed more positively.  It seems 
that it reflects well upon a contractor PM that can discuss a site in depth, rather than only 
superficially through information gathered on the internet or over the phone.  Site visits 
and prior work at a site gives the contractor this depth of knowledge that AFCEE 
selectors prefer.  
Contractors that present an attitude of entitlement due to a previous service, rank, 
or job title also create a negative impression.  The selectors prefer that the contractor 
show why that entitlement should be given.  A very positive reaction was produced when 
a contractor had previous job title, but only used it as a reference to explain how the 
contractor is knowledgeable and capable of performing a task.  For example, if a 
contractor project manager used previous rank or position as a guide to working with a 
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government project manager, it was discussed positively.  One member at AFCEE stated 
that a contractor always knew what submissions were needed and provided them in a 
very timely fashion.  These were not only required submissions, but information that the 
contractor project manager knew would make the government project manager’s job 
easier.  This knowledge was gained by the contractor project manager while working as a 
government agent in a similar position.  The contractor knew that the government agent 
briefed progress dates and made submissions to higher ranking members and that the 
changing of those dates and information caused stress to the government agent.  This is 
an example of positive ways for a contractor to utilize previous rank and position. 
 Truthful representation by the contractor was also discussed positively.  If a 
contractor did not have full understanding of a situation, task, or capability, and stated 
such, it seemed to create a sense of trust between the selector and the contractor.  This, of 
course, is only true if the contractor shows an intention of gaining the knowledge that is 
lacking to benefit both the government and themselves.  One research participant stated 
that he preferred working with a contractor that admitted an ignorance, if there existed 
one, rather than always saying they could accomplish a job without being able to discuss 
details.  The contractor that admitted ignorance, however, must and did show an effort to 
determine his company’s ability to perform the task.  If, after exploration, the contractor 
found they were incapable of fulfilling a task requirement sufficiently, it was truthfully 
discussed with the selection team member.  This developed a trust in the contractor that 
returned benefits in the form of the selection member feeling less risk when 
recommending a task award to that contractor. 
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 Printed materials, such as brochures or publications, touting the capabilities of a 
contractor were discussed negatively.  Most research participants stated that most printed 
material they received from contractors was not even read.  The risks that selection team 
members feel when making a reward are rarely diminished through brochures or printed 
material.  
 One positive aspect of the marketing process that the majority of respondents 
discussed was the briefing of innovative processes by a contractor.  Also, if a contractor 
exhibited the ability to perform at a level much higher than contemporaries, government 
project managers were often eager to learn the reason.  These marketing techniques allow 
government agents to see what is available in the market, especially if they have not 
worked with that particular contractor or innovation.    
  
Differences in Influences on Selection Processes  
One interest of this research was to identify possible differences in influences on 
the selection process between AFCEE and USACE.  The significant differences that were 
uncovered were a result of differences in geographical responsibilities and the sizes of 
contractor pools from which contractors were awarded tasks.   
Most of the customers for USACE-KC are repeat customers, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Because of this, the customers are usually very 
familiar with each contractor in the pool and thus take a part in most selection decisions.  
Customers represented by AFCEE do at times have a preference, but because AFCEE’s 
responsibilities are much larger geographically than USACE-KC’s, the customers often 
are not as familiar with the available contractors.  Because of this, AFCEE will often 
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make the selection without input from the customer.  If, however, the customer does have 
a preference, then it is strongly taken into consideration for final task award.   
In addition, the contractor pool sizes at USACE-KC are smaller than the majority 
of AFCEE IDIQ contractor pools.  As a result of smaller pool sizes at USACE-KC, the 
current workload of a contractor may be more of a factor, as is “turn-taking” between 
contractors.  Also, the smaller IDIQ pools most often do not require the additional 
selection stage of forming a final list of contractor candidates for final task award. 
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 V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the conclusions that can be made based on the analysis of data 
that was gathered from the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) and 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers – Kansas City District (USACE-KC).  These general 
conclusions are in respect to the research questions posed in Chapter I. 
The multiple award IDIQ contract is a very useful tool to the United States 
government.  It allows tasks to be awarded and completed in a more efficient way while 
at the same time reducing risk to the government.  This research sought to gain a better 
understanding of the selection process for task award.  This was accomplished using in-
depth interviews with members of the organization that participate in the selection 
process.  Conducting face-to-face interviews provided rich data that could be analyzed 
for informal influences that affect the final selection decision. 
 
Government – Private Sector Selection Process Comparison 
This research shows multiple similarities between government agencies and the 
private sector in contractor selection processes.  Many of the same influences were 
uncovered through interviews with research participants at AFCEE and USACE-KC as 
were identified in existing private sector research.  Based on these similarities, the 
government should be able to confidently take advantage of research conducted for 
selection processes in the private sector.  The government can apply the concepts in 
existing research to reduce risk in awarding tasks to contractors.  Contractors can more 
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efficiently market themselves to the government as well, creating a better union between 
the two. 
Private sector research attempts to separate the stages in a selection process, making 
the process more manageable for analysis.  By comparing the selection stages the 
government buying process incorporates, from source selection to task award, to the 
stages of selection in the private sector, more insight can gained.  In addition, identifying 
cues for action is discussed in private sector research, offering the opportunity for more 
understanding between buying center and offerer. 
 
AFCEE – USACE-KC Comparison 
Although there are a few differences, both the Air Force Center for Environmental 
Excellence and the Army Corps of Engineers -- Kansas City District are viewed as 
organizational buying centers.  Both organizations use multiple players in the decision-
making process.  These multiple players consist of members of unequal status with 
different stakes in the outcome of the final decision.  Both organizations also make task 
awards based on incomplete information, which leads to risk management issues.   
Contractor pool sizes and geographical responsibilities should be kept in mind when 
making comparisons or generalizations about a buying center.  AFCEE and USACE-KC 
showed that selection processes may slightly differ due to differences in these areas.  
 
Factors Influencing Selection 
Customer preference probably plays the biggest role in an organization’s task award 
decision.  Based on interview results, the researcher can say that both organizations 
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always try to make the customer happy.  Customers can include members at installation 
or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example.  If a customer takes a hard 
stance for one contractor, many of the decision steps at the organizational buying center 
are skipped.  Unless there are special circumstances, the customer always gets what they 
want.  Examples of special circumstances include: a contractor misinforming the 
customer, unethical business practices, ignorance on the part of the customer, contractor 
overload, or past problems with a contractor. 
Contractor expertise can also limit the decision-making process.  If one contractor 
clearly stands above the rest in their ability to perform a task, then that task should be 
awarded to that contractor.  This does not often happen, however, because in the initial 
source selection for the IDIQ contract groups the contractors into those most capable.  
These contractors can usually handle most jobs in their area of expertise. 
An organizational member’s relationship with the contractors in the IDIQ pool is 
affected by many different influences.  A comfortable relationship with the contractor 
point of contact is always preferable for the organizational member.  If the contractor 
POC is someone the organizational member can consider a friendly acquaintance, then 
that contractor had a better chance of being selected for task award.  Other factors that 
this research doesn't address may include discriminators such as age, race, or sex. 
 
Informal Network 
The informal network allows organizational members to gather data on a contractor 
using other organizational members’ relationships and judgments on the contractor.  The 
informal network at both organizations was highly used.  Contractors need to be aware of 
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the significance of the informal network at governmental buying centers.  Relationships 
with any project manager in the organization, whether good or bad, can influence the 
judgments of other members of the organization.  Contractors must also realize that the 
formal rating system used at these governmental buying centers is at most times a lesser 
influence than the informal network.  Developing a good relationship and building trust 
with multiple members of the organization can be the most effective method of ensuring 
future task awards.  Those that were newer to the job tended to rely on the informal 
network to a greater extent than the veterans who had been in place for quite some time. 
 
Contractor Marketing Process 
 The marketing processes that both organizations experienced were viewed largely 
negatively.  This stemmed from the fact that it created a very large drain on manpower at 
the organizations.  Drop-ins were viewed very unfavorably, especially if it was 
unannounced.  Project managers expressed that their selections were not influenced in the 
least by items such as brochures and pamphlets, or by salesmen who were constantly 
pressuring them for upcoming jobs.  In fact, this in many cases created a feeling of 
avoidance in the decision maker.  When asked how a contractor might more efficiently 
spend their and the government’s time in the marketing process, most participants replied 
that contractors should limit themselves to making brief calls periodically to ask about 
upcoming tasks to be award.  If the decision maker needed the contractor to come in for 
further discussion, then that could be arranged during the brief phone call.  Exceptions 
were mentioned for presentations on innovative or extremely successful processes used 
by a contractor to perform tasks. 
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 In general, contractors need to examine their methods of marketing to the 
government selectors.  The marketing process and relationship should feel efficient and 
productive on both government and contractor sides. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Future researchers might attempt a quantitative study on the topics covered in this 
research.  This would provide the opportunity for a greater sample size to be tapped, 
which would in turn facilitate comparison and statistical aggregation of data.   A 
quantitative study would lend more strength to the results of this research. 
 Also, future research endeavors might be made into other government 
organizations, such as the U.S. Navy, General Services Administration, or the 
Department of Transportation.  The results of the current research could then be 
compared and linked to other government organizations, providing results that could be 
more generally applied.   
 Finally, future research might be conducted with contractors that serve as 
members of IDIQ contractor pools.  Gaining perspective from this side of the 
government-contractor relationship would be of great value to the current research.   By 
comparing data gathered using contractors to the current research, one might find it easier 
to identify areas where the relationship is grossly inefficient.  
 
Summary 
 The selection process at AFCEE and USACE-KC can often be very subjective.  
Because contractors in the IDIQ pools are often equally qualified, soft factors are 
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employed as selection criteria.  An understanding of the factors that influence the 
selection process is critical for both the government and contractors.  A more efficient 
relationship is needed.  Further examination of research performed in the private sector 
would be useful to anyone involved in the selection process. 
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 Appendix A. General Interview Guide 
 
IDIQ Selection Process Interview 
 
This interview is for the purpose of gaining information on the informal decision 
processes used by government selectors in the multiple award indefinite quantity-
indefinite delivery contract award process.  Members will be interviewed to determine if 
the selection of a best value to the government follows a naturalistic decision pattern. 
 
Note: While this is the general structure of the interview, differences may occur due to 
the interviewee.  The interview is very unstructured and largely driven by the member 
being interviewed. 
 
What is your position here? 
 
How long have you been responsible for making award decisions? 
 
Describe the IDIQ selection process you use. 
 
What are characteristics you look for in a contractor beyond those specified in award 
regulation? 
 
Do you ever feel time stress when making an award selection?  Does it change the way 
you select? 
 
When the size of the contract is larger, do you change your selection methods at all? 
 
Do you deal with incomplete or ambiguous information on the contractors or the task you 
are awarding?  How do you handle this? 
 
Do shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals ever enter into the selection process?  How 
do you deal with this? 
 
Is the area in which you base your selection dynamic?  How do you deal with changing 
criteria and information? 
 
How do you deal with or work around missing and uncertain information? 
 
Are you ever helped with the selection decision?  Do co-workers or supervisors influence 
your decision in any way? 
 
Do organizational goals and norms influence your selection decision?  Has your 
organization created standard operating procedure in the selection process? 
 
How large a part does your expertise in the field of which you are awarding a task come 
into you decision process? 
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Have you changed your selection methods since first beginning the position? 
 
Do you think your best value decision might differ from another member of the 
organization’s best value decision? 
 
How much instruction are you given on what determines a best value to the government? 
 
Do your own personal values, separate from the organization values, determine any part 
of the selection process? 
 
Do you feel your expertise in the field in which you are making an award plays a large 
role in your determination of best value? 
 
When determining a best value contractor are you more concerned with identifying a 
satisfactory choice or identifying the very best choice? 
 
Do you use a grading sheet to evaluate contractors? 
 
What are your methods for screening out candidates for award? 
 
How do you feel about contractor marketing? 
 
What causes a contractor to stand out to you? 
 
What contractor actions cause you to favor them? 
 
What contractor actions cause distrust? 
 
Two contractors are equally qualified for a task: How do you choose between them? 
 
How does the informal network in your organization influence selection decisions? 
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 Appendix B. Questionnaire Results 
 
A synopsis of the responses to questions posed to the research participants is shown 
below: 
Describe the IDIQ selection process. 
Research participants at both AFCEE and USACE reported that the process of selection 
was a team effort and that no selections were made by a single individual.  Some 
members may have more influence on the final selection decision, but the process always 
had inputs from multiple players. 
 
What characteristics do you look for in a contractor besides those specified in 
regulations? 
Selection team members look for a contractor that exhibits a willingness to operate on a 
teamwork level with the government.  They want contractors to work with them when 
dealing with contract modifications or end of the year funding.  An honest and open 
relationship should be had by the government pm and the contractor pm. 
 
Does time stress affect the way members make decisions? 
Participants unanimously said that the method of selection is not affected by tasks that are 
accompanied by higher time stresses. 
 
Does contract size affect selection process? 
Research participants gave no indication that the size of a contract changed the selection 
process in any way. 
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Does incomplete or ambiguous information get used in the selection process? 
In terms of subjective judgments made by the selection members, yes.  Government 
agents must compare aspects of contractors that cannot be measured on a scale and 
aspects that may change with the selection member.  Issues such as trust placed in a 
contractor, chemistry between selector and contractor personnel, and contractor 
commitment to a team effort are all aspects that research participants listed as grounds for 
selecting a contractor for task award. 
 
Do shifting, ill-defined or competing goals influence the selection process? 
They probably play less a role in the government agencies than they do in the private 
sector.  Government agents are told to award the task to the contractor that represents the 
best value for the government.  The only time a competing goal will rise is usually when 
one contractor represents the best value to the government but the task must be awarded 
to a contractor who hasn’t received the required dollar amount of projects.  When this 
happens, the under-awarded  contractor will receive the award because it is a hard 
requirement and the “best value” decision is often ambiguous, which is the reason for this 
research. 
 
Are the selection criteria dynamic?   
In terms of during the selection of one task, no.  In terms of  between different tasks, yes.  
Many aspects can take a large role in the selection criteria for a job.  Customer 
preference, for example, can often overrule the recommendations of the selection team. 
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Do co-workers or supervisors outside of the selection team ever influence the 
selection decision?   
Yes, the informal network at both AFCEE and USACE is very robust.  Selectors often 
request information on contractors being considered for award from peers.  In fact, both 
agencies have a formal grading format in which contractors are rated and put into a 
database for other members of the organization to use.  While this database is used, the 
informal network is used more often and has a greater influence on the outcome.  This 
may be because it takes extra work to rate contractors, especially in extreme cases such as 
excellent or poor ratings. 
 
How large a part does your expertise in the field of which you are awarding a task 
come into you decision process? 
If a selector has a high level of expertise in the task which is being awarded, they may 
have more confidence in judging the ability of the contractor to successfully execute a 
project.  If not, the selector may use aspects such a personal chemistry with the contractor 
personnel to make a selection recommendation.  Either way, the selection judgment is 
most often based on soft factors. 
 
Have you changed your selection methods since first beginning the position? 
The biggest change that research participants revealed is the tendency to rely less on the 
informal network as they gain experience with all contractors in the IDIQ process.  As 
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they gain more experience, however, they are also usually approached for informal 
recommendations by other members without as much experience. 
 
Do you think your best value decision might differ from another member of the 
organization’s best value decision? 
Most members admitted that selection recommendations may change between members 
of the organization.  This is due to the subjectivity of the factors on which selectors base 
their decisions.  Soft factors become the criteria for selection since all contractors in the 
IDIQ pool have already met the hard criteria that is used in the source selection. 
 
How do you feel about contractor marketing? 
A large majority of research participants expressed dissatisfaction with the marketing 
process used by contractors.  Most stated that the marketing process consumed much of 
their time and did not play a large role in the selection process.  For the most part, they 
thought it was unnecessary. 
 
What contractor actions cause you to favor them? 
Contractors that exhibited a willingness to work as a team with the government brought 
about a level of trust that made many selectors favor them.  Those that kept project 
managers involved with projects and stayed on schedule were also viewed favorably. 
 
What contractor actions cause distrust? 
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Contractors that take advantage of the government when the opportunity arises are 
viewed with distrust by selection team members.  Examples of this include demanding 
higher fees for contract modifications and taking advantage of the system during end of 
year project funding. 
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 Appendix C. Research Participant Information 
 
 
  AFCEE USACE 
Members 
Contacted 42 6 
Research 
Participants 11 6 
Average # 
Years on 
Job 5 9 
 
The methods of contacting research at the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence 
(AFCEE) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) differed.  At AFCEE, a list of 
project managers was obtained and the researcher contacted each project manager 
individually.  Those that showed an interest or willingness to participate in the research 
were interviewed and included in the research.  At USACE, a point of contact was 
consulted and set up interviews with the research participants.  The researcher did not 
know if these participants were interested or willing to volunteer for the research, but all 
participants contacted contributed to the research. 
 Initially, the U.S. Navy was to be included in the research to make the results 
more generalizable across the cultures in the Department of Defense (DoD).  However, 
due to a lack of response from those Navy organizations contacted, only the U.S. Air 
Force and the U.S. Army are represented in the research. 
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 Appendix D. Research Approval Letter 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY (AFMC) 
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO 
          20 October 
2004 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR AFIT/ENV 
               ATTN: Jason Blevins 
 
FROM:  AFRL/HEH 
 
SUBJECT:  Approval for the Use of Volunteers in Demonstrations 
 
 
1. Human experimentation as described in Protocol 05-02-E 
"Information Decision Driver/Models in the Indefinite 
Delivery – Indefinite Quality Contractor Selection Process” 
may begin. 
 
2.  In accordance with AFI 40-402, this protocol was reviewed 
and approved by the Wright Site Institutional Review Board 
(WSIRB) on 7 October 2004, the AFRL Chief of Aerospace 
Medicine on 15 October 2004.  
 
3.  Please notify the undersigned of any changes in 
procedures prior to their implementation.  A judgment will be 
made at that time whether or not a complete WSIRB review is 
necessary. 
 
 
      Signed 20 October 2004 
HELEN JENNINGS    
Human Use Administrator       
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 Appendix E. AFCEE IDIQ Contract Information 
 
 
GEITA: Global Engineering, Integration and Technical Assistance 
The GEITA contracts support AFCEE’s technical capability with professional Advisory 
and Assistance Services (A&AS) in support of Environmental Restoration, Base 
Realignment and Closure, environmental conservation and planning, and environmental 
quality programs.  In addition, GEITA provides A&AS in support of pollution prevention 
and compliance aspects, infrastructure and weapons systems, Air Installation Compatible 
Use Zone, Environmental Impact Analysis Process, Air Force-Environmental 
Management Information System, and the Air Force Military Family Housing 
Privatization Initiative.  The GEITA program ceiling is $150M.  There are four 
contractors in the GEITA IDIQ pool. 
 
4P A-E: Worldwide Planning, Programs, and Design – 2003 
the world ride planning, program, and designed contracts.  Support the four AFCEE 
pillars: environmental conservation and planning, environment quality, environment 
restoration, and design construction.  4P A-E contract other follow-on contract to3P A-E.  
4P A-E contract consist of multiple awards of Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity 
contracts.  The program ceiling for 4P A-E is $1.1 billion.  The government may 
unilaterally increase the program ceiling up to $2.75 billion based upon requirements and 
usage.  The 4P A-E Contracts offer a full range of Title I, Title II and other architect - 
engineer services to support environmental and traditional programs and locations 
worldwide.  There are 30 contractors in this IDIQ pool. 
 
AE45PC: Architectural, Engineering and Planning Services 
This contract will provide Architectural, Engineering and Planning services primarily for 
military family housing, force protection, commercial facilities and infrastructures 
located in the Pacific Rim area, Continental United States and other military bases 
worldwide.  Requirements may include, but not be limited to: (a) Title I Services - 
schematic designs, design charrettes, existing building conditions plans, preparation of 
specifications and construction contract documents, value engineering, cost estimating, 
landscape and irrigation designed; (b) Title II Services - construction management and 
inspection, some middle reviews, site visits, preparation of as-built drawings; (c) Other 
Services - preparing, revising an aching Air Force civil engineer publications, design 
guides, handbooks, and tutorials; interior design; project programming (DD Forms 1391), 
and Requirements and Management Plans (RAMPS); renderings; installation (military 
base), site, utility, traffic, facility, and interior space utilization planning studies and 
analyses; surveys and reports including geotechnical, topographic, environmental, 
hazardous material (asbestos, lead based paint, etc.), and facility condition/utilization 
assessments/analysis.  There are seven contractors in this IDIQ pool. 
 
DB+: Design Build Plus 
AFCEE's Design-Build Plus (DB+) Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 
construction services contract was awarded on 10 Jan 02. Contract scope focuses on 
constructing military family housing, but will accommodate other functions such as 
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dormitories, transient lodging facilities, and administration facilities. DB+ services are 
limited to CONUS, Hawaii and Alaska. Projects are awarded by task orders with no 
minimum or maximum on orders.  There are three contractors in this IDIQ pool. 
 
DB03+ Design Build Plus 2003 
Design Build Plus 03 (DBP03) is a multiple IDIQ contract with awards to nine (9) 
contractors under a Full and Open (F&O) program. The program ceiling for DBP03 is 
$2.1 billion with the potential to increase to $5.25 billion. 
 
Military Family Housing Privatization Portfolio Management 
AFCEE has been designated as the AF Portfolio Manager executing all processes, 
procedures, and activities necessary to manage the post-closing risks and issues 
associated with AF housing privatization projects ensuring long term success. 
Responsibilities include; monitoring and evaluation, reporting, solution implementation, 
fiduciary responsibilities, and document management for the 50 year life of housing 
privatization projects. Centralized Portfolio Management is key to monitoring a portfolio 
of 40+ AF installations (more than 40,000 homes). 
Portfolio management: 
• Provides key stakeholders with timely and relevant assessments of performance  
• Provides early identification of and intervention into issues impacting 
performance  
• Provides and facilitates solutions, data flow and standardized reporting  
• Enables the Air Force to identify and disseminate best practices and lessons 
learned  
• Provides a consistent approach to evaluation and problem resolution  
• Provides continuity in oversight  
The program ceiling on the portfolio management contract is $29M. There is one 
contractor in this IDIQ pool. 
 
PSC: Privatization Support Contracts 
AFCEE, the Air Force's center of excellence for housing privatization, has developed a 
program that matches Air Force requirements to real estate market opportunities to 
provide the best value housing, maximize developer creativity, and return a transaction 
with high potential for successful execution. The AF will use a privatization support 
contractor (PSC) to assist in the execution of the program. As a result of privatization, the 
private developer will own the housing, Air Force personnel will receive BAH and pay 
rent to the private developer. The private sector developer will manage and maintain the 
housing. Utilities will be paid by the tenant directly to the utility provider. Base personnel 
will no longer directly manage or control the housing.  There are five contractors in this 
IDIQ pool. 
 
ECOS: Environmental, Construction and Operations & Services 
The Environmental, Construction and Operations & Services (ECOS) contracts are the 
follow-on to the Environmental Minor Construction and Operations & Services 
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(EMCOS) contracts. ECOS contracts consist of seven (7) small business set-aside 
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract awards.  
The program ceiling for ECOS is $150 million with the potential to increase to $375 
million. The ECOS contract offers a broad range of construction, repair, and demolition 
work, to include both traditional and environmental; plus force protection and homeland 
security. In addition this contract will provide operations and services for environmental 
conservation, compliance, pollution prevention and clean-up activities, and will include 
ordnance removal and disposal, energy management, and Geographic Information 
Systems.  There are seven contractors in this IDIQ pool. 
 
WERC: Worldwide Environmental Restoration & Construction 
The Worldwide Environmental Restoration and Construction (WERC) contracts are the 
follow-on to the Environmental Remediation and Construction (ENRAC) contracts. 
WERC contracts consist of multiple awards of Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity 
(IDIQ) contracts. 
The program ceiling for WERC is $4 billion with the potential to increase to $10 billion. 
The worldwide construction contracts offer a full range of construction and engineering 
activities to meet all base requirements. Requirements are primarily environmental but 
will also include a secondary requirement for traditional engineering needs. WERC also 
offers demolition, repair, emergency response, and operation and maintenance 
opportunities for both environmental and traditional engineering activities.  There are 27 
contractors in this IDIQ pool. 
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